Legal arrangements rest on behavioural, cognitive, social, and other assumptions regarding their role and function in society and the legal system. The identification and subsequent evaluation of these assumptions is an important task for legal scholarship. In this article, we focus on the identification and categorisation of these assumptions, providing conceptual distinctions and methodological guidance. We distinguish between assumptions about the value(s), norm(s), or interest(s) underlying a legal arrangement, which can be legal or non-legal, and assumptions about the relationship between the legal arrangement and its underlying value(s), norm(s), or interest(s), which can be logical, causal, or contributory. Regarding the identification, we consider explicit references and inference to the best explanation and theory-driven evaluations as possible methods. Inference to the best explanation, we posit, functions as a manner of reconstructing the theory that the person(s) creating a legal arrangement had in mind regarding the place and function of that legal arrangement in society. Given this, we offer a step-by-step approach to reconstructing this theory in use, drawing from theory-driven evaluations and its sources in the social sciences. These distinctions and guidelines can contribute to understanding the context and untangling the complexities involved in identifying the assumptions that underlie legal arrangements. |
Search result: 15 articles
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, May 2022 |
Keywords | (Legislative) assumptions, legal arrangements, inference to the best explanation, theory-driven evaluations |
Authors | Frans L. Leeuw and Antonia M. Waltermann |
AbstractAuthor's information |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, March 2022 |
Keywords | moral reasoning, legal education, scholarship of teaching and learning, defining issues test |
Authors | Emanuel van Dongen and Steven Raaijmakers |
AbstractAuthor's information |
Developing the capacity for moral judgment is an essential professional competence for lawyers. What teaching and learning activities in the law curriculum can be used in order to contribute to students’ moral reasoning and moral judgment? Four teaching methods were tried out in the period 2019 to 2021 at the Utrecht University School of Law: teaching methods that either work with (hypothetical) dilemmas (I); in-class reflection papers (II); experiential learning based on own experiences in a simulation situation (III); or clinical teaching in a real law firm (IV). The effects of these methods on the development of moral reasoning were measured using the Defining Issues Test (DIT). Additional information on the effectiveness and utility of the method was gathered using semi-structured interviews with teachers. The DIT results were compared at the beginning and at the end of the courses and related to the teaching methods. This article presents the outcomes of this study and formulates some recommendations for further research on the topic. |
Redactioneel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, August 2021 |
Keywords | professional ethics |
Authors | Emanuel van Dongen and Jet Tigchelaar |
AbstractAuthor's information |
The theme of the special issue of Law and Method on Education in (Professional) Legal Ethics consists both of content-related as well as didactical-oriented contributions, of which most are written in the Dutch language and two are written in the English language. The content-related approaches show that in education in legal ethics use can be made of professional standards, constitutional principles as well as general ethical theories (such as utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics). Because lawyers work with ‘the law’, broader or narrower conceptions of law (in relation to morality) also affect legal reasoning and are therefore relevant to education in professional legal ethics. However, these approaches are also put into perspective: the leap forward from moral reasoning based on abstract core values and ethical principles to morally correct action in concrete moral dilemmas in legal practice is a large one. Several solutions are proposed: I. teach ethics indirectly, stressing the importance of facts and of professional role consciousness, and of the importance of formal and informal respect for all concerned, as an essential part of the professional lawyers’ role (Kaptein – written in English); II. use insights from social psychology to overcome barriers to actual ethical behaviour (Becker and Mackor); III. use dialogues about case studies that demonstrate different aspects of judicial ethics for judges (Brenninkmeijer&Bish – written in English) or IV. give (to future governmental lawyers) context-sensitive bottom-up moral dilemmas to enhance realism, alertness and role resistance against opposing forces (Van Lochem). A relevant theme in the didactical approaches to legal ethics is the absence or limited practical professional experience law students have, so that, for example, conversation techniques based on personal experience have limited value. At university level, this can be remedied to some extent by reinforcing one’s own experience, i.e. experiential learning, or by bringing the experiences of others into the classroom, for example with guest lecturers from the field, or by telling and discussing fictional or true stories (Van Dongen & Tigchelaar). Education at university gives a good starting point for (professional) legal ethics, followed by post-academic legal ethics education and legal practice as lifelong learning school. A contribution with a focus on the notary (Waaijer) highlights the different approaches within this continuum. |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, July 2021 |
Keywords | professional ethics, legal ethics, research ethics, moral psychology |
Authors | Anne Ruth Mackor |
AbstractAuthor's information |
In dit artikel geeft de auteur haar visie op het onderwijs in beroepsethiek aan rechtenstudenten. Ze bespreekt de inhoud van de juridische beroepsethiek en enkele didactische aspecten. De auteur maakt onderscheid tussen rechtvaardigende perspectieven, die een explicatie en rechtvaardiging van een onderscheidende juridische beroepsethiek en -moraal mogelijk maken, en kritische perspectieven, die een kritische beoordeling van die rechtvaardigende verhalen mogelijk maken. Ze benadrukt daarbij het belang van empirische, in het bijzonder sociaal- en moraalpsychologische benaderingen in het onderwijs van beroepsethiek. Ze wijst op het feit dat studenten niet beschikken over relevante praktijkervaring en dat dit een obstakel vormt voor diepgaande casusanalyses. In de conclusie betoogt de auteur dat de belangstelling en de ruimte voor het onderwijs in beroepsethiek aan rechtenstudenten sinds het nieuwe millennium wel is toegenomen, maar dat meer systematische reflectie op deze vakken nodig is. Ook stelt ze dat bij het onderwijs in beroepsethiek aan rechtenstudenten die nog geen werkervaring hebben in een specifieke beroepspraktijk, de nadruk zou moeten liggen op thema’s die in de beroepsopleiding minder aandacht krijgen. Het accent moet meer liggen op het verwerven van ethische en empirische theoretische kennis en kritische reflectie op rechtvaardigende verhalen, en minder op discussie over concrete gevallen. Haar laatste aanbeveling is dat in het onderwijs niet alleen normatief-ethische theorieën aan de orde moeten komen, maar ook empirische inzichten over bounded ethicality. |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, June 2021 |
Authors | Emanuel van Dongen and Jet Tigchelaar |
AbstractAuthor's information |
In deze bijdrage bespreken de auteurs inhoudelijke en didactische aanknopingspunten voor de integratie van professionele ethiek in de academische juridische opleiding. Dat gaat wat de auteurs betreft verder dan (enkel) het leren van gedragsregels, maar betreft ook de (kritisch-)ethische reflectie (op de professionele rol) van de jurist en ethische oordeelsvorming. Aanknopingspunten uit rechtstheoretische en onderwijskundige literatuur vragen om een curriculum brede, stapsgewijze, inbedding met passende toetsing. Dit onderwijs dient idealiter een combinatie te zijn van afzonderlijke meta-juridische vakken over recht en ethiek, positiefrechtelijke vakken die ethische elementen bevatten, klinische training en specifieke vakken over beroeps- of professionele ethiek. In dit artikel bespreken de auteurs diverse methoden die kunnen worden gebruikt om het onderwijs vorm te geven en illustreren dit met enkele voorbeelden uit het Utrechts universitair juridisch onderwijs. Actieve participatie, reflectie en – idealiter – eigen ervaringen zijn daarbij van groot belang. Een aantal modellen uit niet-juridische disciplines kan behulpzaam zijn bij het bieden van structuur voor ethische reflectie, voor zover het morele sensitiviteit en morele oordeelsvorming stimuleert. Verscheidene toetsingselementen op het terrein van de ethiek zijn door het curriculum heen nodig. Leeractiviteiten en toetsing kunnen worden opgebouwd in het curriculum van kennis en begrip, naar competenties ten aanzien van ethische dilemma’s en moreel oordelen. |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, June 2021 |
Keywords | legal ethics, informal respect, educational integration, importance of setting examples |
Authors | Hendrik Kaptein |
AbstractAuthor's information |
Legal ethics may be taught indirectly, given resistance to ethics as a separate and presumably merely subjective subject. This may be done by stressing the importance of facts (as the vast majority of legal issues relate to contested facts), of professional role consciousness and of the importance of formal and informal respect for all concerned. This indirect approach is best integrated into the whole of the legal curriculum, in moot practices and legal clinics offering perceptions of the administration of legal justice from receiving ends as well. Basic knowledge of forensic sciences, argumentation and rhetoric may do good here as well. Teachers of law are to set an example in their professional (and general) conduct. |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, October 2020 |
Keywords | comparative legal studies, legal education, pragmatism |
Authors | Alexandra Mercescu |
Author's information |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, February 2019 |
Keywords | active participation, Basic Building Blocks Map (BBB Map), cognitivism & constructivism, teaching method |
Authors | Renetta Bos |
AbstractAuthor's information |
When it comes to learning, mapping turns out to be an effective tool. There is a wide variety of information maps, such as mind maps, argument maps and concept maps. This paper develops a teaching method that puts mapping at the centre of a seminar. It builds upon ideas of cognitivism and constructivism. The proposed didactic method incorporates a new variant of mapping, Basic Building Blocks Map (BBB Map), with a specific style of teaching. It is argued that this teaching method leads to engaged and active student participation. By dividing the subject up into small pieces and searching for answers to questions interactively, the student will learn more effectively. The paper concludes by providing teachers tools to put the method of BBB Mapping into practice. |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, November 2018 |
Keywords | play, legal education, legal philosophy, student engagement |
Authors | Hedwig van Rossum |
AbstractAuthor's information |
This article introduces the concepts of play and playfulness within the context of legal-philosophical education. I argue that integrating play and playfulness in legal education engages students and prepares them for dealing with the perpetual uncertainty of late modernity that they will face as future legal professionals. This article therefore aims to outline the first contours of a useful concept of play and playfulness in legal education. Drawing on the work of leading play-theorists Huizinga, Caillois, Lieberman and Csikszentmihalyi, play within legal education can be described as a (1) partly voluntary activity that (2) enables achievement of learning goals, (3) is consciously separate from everyday life by rules and/or make believe, (4) has its own boundaries in time and space, (5) entails possibility, tension and uncertainty and (6) promotes the formation of social grouping. Playfulness is a lighthearted state of mind associated with curiosity, creativity, spontaneity and humor. Being playful also entails being able to cope with uncertainty. The integration of these concepts of play and playfulness in courses on jurisprudence will be illustrated by the detailed description of three play and playful activities integrated in the course ‘Introduction to Legal Philosophy’ at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, September 2018 |
Authors | Peter Mascini |
AbstractAuthor's information |
This paper starts by reviewing empirical research that threatens law and economics’ initial success. This research has demonstrated that the functioning of the law cannot be well understood based on the assumption of the rational actor and that policies which are based on this assumption are likely to be flawed. Subsequently, three responses to this criticism are discussed. Whereas the first response denounces this criticism by maintaining that the limitations attributed to the rational actor can easily be incorporated in rational choice theory, the second response welcomes the criticism as an opportunity to come up with an integrative theory of law and behavior. The third response also takes the criticism seriously but replaces the aspiration to come up with such an integrative theory by a context-sensitive approach. It will be argued that the first two responses fall short while the third response offers a promising way to go forward. |
Comparative methodology is an important and a widely used method in the legal literature. This method is important inter alia to search for alternative national rules and acquire a deeper understanding of a country’s law. According to a survey of over 500 Dutch legal scholars, 61 per cent conducts comparative research (in some form). However, the methodological application of comparative research generally leaves much to be desired. This is particularly true when it comes to case selection. This applies in particular to conceptual and dogmatic research questions, possibly also allowing causal explanations for differences between countries. This article suggests that the use of an interdisciplinary research design could be helpful, and Hofstede’s cultural-psychological dimensions can offer a solution to improve the methodology of selection criteria. |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, December 2015 |
Authors | Francisca Christina Wilhelmina de Graaf LL.M |
AbstractAuthor's information |
Central to this contribution is the question whether Dworkin’s theory of constructive interpretation as a method of applying law for the judge, can be used as a method of legal-dogmatic research. Constructive interpretation is a method of legal interpretation that aims to find a normative unity in the diversity of rules that characterize a legal system. In order to find an answer to this question, the key elements of Dworkin’s theory are explained and applied to the author’s PhD research. Methodological difficulties that could give rise to problems when applying Dworkin’s theory, are investigated. In the end, the author concludes that since the judge and the scholar use quite the same methods when interpreting law, the principles of constructivism should fit legal research well, even though some aspects of Dworkin’s theory are difficult to operationalize in practice. As a leading notion however, constructivism constitutes a workable method of legal research. |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, April 2015 |
Authors | Bert van Roermund |
Abstract |
This paper raises two methodological questions from a philosophical perspective: (i) what is involved in a functionalist approach to law and (ii) what should be the focus of such an approach? To answer these questions, I will take two steps with both. To begin with, I argue that Pettit’s view on functionalist approaches may be made relevant for law; functionalist accounts target a virtual mechanism that explains why a system will be resilient under changes in either the system or its environment. Secondly, I make a distinction between two interpretations of his key-concept ‘resilience’, one in mechanical, the other in teleological terms. With regard to the second question I will take two steps as well. I argue why it does not make sense to ascribe wide functions to law, followed by a plea for a limited view on the function of law. This limited view is based on a teleological understanding of the law’s resilience. I argue that these two modes are interrelated in ways that are relevant for the interdisciplinary study of law. |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, 2013 |
Keywords | governmentality, methodology, method, skill |
Authors | Bal Sokhi-Bulley |
AbstractAuthor's information |
How can we teach critical legal education? The article tackles this key question by focusing on the role of methodology in legal education and research. I argue that critical legal education requires marketing methodology as a ‘skill’, thereby freeing it from what students and researchers in Law often view as the negative connotations of ‘theory’. This skill requires exploring ‘alternative methodologies’ – those critical perspectives that depart from legal positivism and which Law traditionally regards as ‘peripheral’. As an example, the article explores the Foucauldian concept of governmentality as a useful methodological tool. The article also discusses the difference between theory, methodology and method, and reviews current academic contributions on law and method(ology). Ultimately, it suggests a need for a ‘revolt of conduct’ in legal education. Perhaps then we might hope for students that are not docile and disengaged (despite being successful lawyers) but, rather, able to nurture an attitude that allows for ‘thinking’ (law) critically. |
Artikel |
|
Journal | Law and Method, 2012 |
Keywords | curriculum rechtenstudie, aard van het recht, positief recht, (hulp)wetenschappen |
Authors | Jaap Hage |
AbstractAuthor's information |
The central issue of this paper is to outline a scientifically oriented course in law. Most actual courses focus on positive law, and the main conclusion of this paper is that this is wrong. This conclusion is based on the premise that law is not by definition positive law, but the answer to the question which rules should be enforced by collective means. This premise is argued in the full paper.Positive law is law to the extent that it should be enforced by collective means, and not by definition. Therefore a scientific course in law should pay some attention to positive law, but should not assign it the dominant place in the curriculum which it presently tends to have.To make this abstract idea more concrete, some proposals are made for a law curriculum. The starting point is that the law bachelor should only address positive law where this is necessary for exercises in legal reasoning. Moreover it should address the viable fundamental visions on the nature of law, the main theories about normative reasoning (main currents in ethics), and the facts which are relevant in the light of these normative theories for the question which norms should be enforced by collective means. These facts include both positive law and the results of the different sciences (e.g. psychology, sociology, economy, and biology) which are relevant to answer the normative question. Because there are too many scientific results to take in during a bachelor course, the study of the sciences should be replaced by an introduction to scientific method, which allows lawyers to evaluate the outcomes of scientific research. Finally, the bachelor course should also address ‘generic positive law’, the main questions which must be answered by legal systems and the most viable answers to these questions.The master phase of the curriculum should, for those lawyers who want to practice the positive law of a particular jurisdiction, be filled with the detailed study of the relevant positive law. |